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THE NORTH KOREA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: 
SOUTH KOREAN AND INTERNATIONAL 
EFFORTS AND THE NECESSITY FOR THE LAW 
Shinbum Hant 
INTRODUCTION 
The severity of human rights infringement in North Korea is known 
throughout the world. The Freedom House classifies North Korea as a 
country that is "not free," and gives out the lowest grades on extent of 
freedom, civil liberties, and political rights.' Amnesty International accuses 
North Korea of being "in a category of its own when it comes to human 
rights violations. '2 Human Rights Watch observes that the totalitarian rule 
continued since Kim Jong-un gained power after his father's death in De-
cember 2011. 3 There have been numerous cases of brutal authoritarianism 
in history. Repression in North Korea is appalling, however, particularly in 
this age when civilization as a whole made great strides in protection of 
human dignity. 
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of the North 
Korean Human Rights Act (NKRA)4 in South Korea. The U.S. and Japan 
enacted laws addressing the issue in the 2000s, and international pressure 
t I would like to thank Eunkyo Hong and Seung Yun Kim and for their research 
assistance on recent economic and social development in North Korea. I also wish to 
thank Jin-gyeong Lim for her graphical work. 
1. Freedom in the World: North Korea, Freedom House, https:/ffreedomhouse.org/ 
report/freedom-world/2014/north-korea#.VYinq IJYMrg (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
2. North Korea, Amnesty Int'l UK, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/issues/North-Ko-
rea (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
3. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014: North Korea 1. 
4. The North Korea Human Rights Act, or NKHRA, means the bills submitted to 
the National Assembly in South Korea, as well as the law which was finally enacted in 
March 2016, unless it specifically indicates law in other countries on North Korean 
human rights. See Ha-young Choi, S. Korean Assembly expects N. Korean human 
rights bill soon, NK NEWS (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.nknews.org/2015/09/s-ko-
rean-assembly-expects-n-korean-human-rights-bill-soon/. The bills have different 
names. The bill by Representative Hwang Jin-ha in June 2005, for example, was titled 
Bukhan-jumin-ui indojeok jiwon mit in'gwon-jeungjin-e gwan-han beop-ryul-an (Bill 
on Humanitarian Assistance and Improvement of Human Rights of North Korean Re-
sidents). The bills are collectively referred to as the North Korean Human Rights Act, 
or NKHRA in this Article. The term does not include bills by the left-wing parties, 
which provide for humanitarian assistance without reference to such institutions as 
human rights foundation and archive. 
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on North Korea is rising. South Korean legislators have been seeking to 
ratify a similar law in their country since Representative Hwang Jin-ha5 first 
introduced NKHRA at a National Assembly committee 6 in June 2005. It 
took the law more than a decade to come to a vote at the plenary session. 
Possibility had appeared to be remote for NKHRA's ratification by the 
end of the 19th Assembly, until DPRK's fourth nuclear test on January 6, 
2016, and satellite launch on February 7, 2016, in violation of United Na-
tions Security Council resolutions turned the international opinion against 
the country. Reaction was swift, as the Security Council passed Resolution 
2270, sanction measures against Pyongyang. 7 South Korea and United 
States launched one of the largest joint military drills in March, as Pyongy-
ang continued to threaten a nuclear war. Seoul on its own imposed new 
sanctions with asset freeze and the nullification of the project, which al-
lowed Russian cargo to be transported to South and other countries through 
North Korean port of Najin. Under such circumstances, lawmakers in Seoul 
faced an urgent need to enact the law, and finally approved it on March 2, 8 
right before the Assembly election in April 2016. 
Opponents of NKHRA question whether the law would have any im-
mediate or practical effect. The law won't turn North Korea into a utopia 
overnight, but condemnation of the human rights situation by outsiders does 
trouble Pyongyang. Furthermore, North Koreans are finally waking up to 
events that occur outside their country, and they are realizing that the state 
is not an entity to be followed absolutely. There are signs that citizens of 
5. The terms in Korean language in this Article are written based on the Romani-
zation system of Kuklip-kuk'eo-won (National Institute of Korean Language), except for 
terms such as Park Geun-hye and Kim Il-sung, which are widely cited in international 
media. Names of South and North Korean politicians, officials, and legislators are writ-
ten with the family name first. 
6. The name of the committee responsible for foreign relations and national unifi-
cation changed over the years. Tong'il-oegyo-tongsang-wiwonhoe(Unification, Foreign 
Affairs, Commerce Committee) was changed to Oegyo-tongsang-tong'il-wiwonhoe 
(Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Unification Committee) in August 2008. See also Parlia-
mentary bodies dealing with internationaltrade:ForeignAffairs and Unification Com-
mittee, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, http://www.ipu.org/english/parline/reports/ 
instance/2_305.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). The name again was changed to Oegyo-
tong'il-wiwonhoe (Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, (FAUC)) in 2013. See 
generally Foreign Affairs & Unification Committee, http://uft.na.go.kr/site (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2016). The committee will be referred to as FAUC in this Article, irrespective 
of its actual name. 
7. The resolution, the strongest ever, provided, among other things, for cargo in-
spection, embargo, and expulsion of North Korea diplomats involved in violation of the 
sanctions. 
8. The law will go into effect on September 4, 2016. 
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Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are yearning for a change, 
and a day may come when they finally choose their leaders in a democrati-
cally held election. 
I. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 
The North Korean state practices one of the most egregious forms of 
human rights violations. The criminal justice system operates at the whim 
of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), and public execution, beatings, and 
other types of exploitation routinely occur. The government does not toler-
ate freedom of press, assembly, religion, or ideology. Elections are a sham, 
and only journalism sponsored by the government is allowed. Between 
80,000 and 120,000 inmates9 are confined in four gwanliso.'0 The govern-
ment seeks out underground church, and those caught practicing Christian-
ity come under heavy punishment. Tens of thousands of small and large 
statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are scattered throughout the coun-
try, to which residents pay respect. 
Under the songbun" system, the population is classified into specific 
classes along a social hierarchy, based on perceived allegiance to the re-
gime. Those whose ancestors joined the anti-Japanese movement with Kim 
Il-sung have the highest social status. A resident or a descendant of a resi-
dent who had a bourgeois background faces discrimination in food, job, and 
other opportunities. Pyongyang is a privileged place, and only those who 
are the best looking and possess proven loyalty can live in the city.' 
2 
In addition to political persecutions, the standard of living inside 
DPRK is one of the lowest in the world. The communist economic system 
which ignored market mechanism and did not reward individual incentives 
was grossly inefficient.'3 The theory of self-reliance (juche) notwithstand-
ing, the Kim Il-sung government relied excessively on donations from its 
communist allies, particularly the USSR, ever since the foundation of the 
country after World War II. While Vietnam, China and other socialist coun-
tries embarked on economic restructuring in the 1980s and the 1990s, 
DPRK refused to open its doors and further isolated itself. Default on for-
eign debt instruments by the mid-I 980s made it impossible for Pyongyang 
9. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the comm'n of inquiry on hum. rts. in the Demo-
cratic People's Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/63 (2014). 
10. Literally, a management center, a euphemism for a prison camp. 
11. Status. 
12. Rep. of the comm'n of inquir., supra note 9 39, 41. 
13. North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-333, § 3(4); see 
generally STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA: MAR-
KETS, AID, AND REFORM (2007). 
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22 
to raise funds in the international financial market.'4 The quantity of foreign 
donations plummeted with the collapse of the USSR, and North Korean 
economy nosedived. 
The 1990s was an agonizing time for North Koreans as the breakdown 
of the public distribution system forced them to endure gonan-ui 
haeng'gun.'5 Ministry of Unification' 6 estimates that approximately 
330,000 people died of hunger between 1996 and 2000,17 and many of those 
who survived had difficult times, too. 8 Floods in 1995 and 1996 and a 
drought in 1997 only worsened the plight.' 9 
Arable land is limited in North Korea, particularly in the north with the 
rugged, mountainous terrain. However, famine could have been eased or 
even prevented through irrigation, forestation, and upgrading of hydro-
power facilities, and if Pyongyang did not wait until 1995 to actively appeal 
for international relief.20 Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il and those with power did 
not refrain from their extravagant lifestyles, regardless of the large-scale 
pain and misery. 
21 
II. WHITHER NORTH KOREA? 
Even DPRK is not impervious to changes, however. In December 
1991, Pyongyang launched a special economic zone in Rajin-Sonbong or 
Rason, nearby the Chinese and Russian border, to draw investment from the 
two countries. The manufacturing complex in Kaesong, a city 50 kilometers 
north of Seoul, was one of the biggest collaborative projects between the 
14. See HAGGARD & NOLAND, supra note 13, at 27-31; North Korea is Told of 
Loan Default, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/23/world/ 
north-korea-is-told-of-loan-default.html. 
15. Translated by the author as Arduous March. The term originally meant the 
bitter struggle of Kim ll-sung and his peers in Manchuria from 1938 to 1939, in their 
guerilla movement against Japanese colonialists. Pyongyang used the term in the 1990s, 
as it urged residents to maintain their loyalty to the state despite searing poverty. 
16. Tong'il-bu. 
17. Bukhan jisik sajeon (Fact on North Korea), MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION, http:// 
nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewNkKnwldgDicary.do?pagelndex=2&koreanChrctr 
=&dicaryld=4 (last visited Mar. 9, 2016). 
18. From mirror images to portraitsof contradiction,KOREA JOONGANG DAILY 
(Aug. 15, 2015), http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=30 
07921. 
19. BRUCE CUMINGS, NORTH KOREA: ANOTHER COUNTRY 179-81 (2004). 
20. Rep. of the comm'n of inquiry, supra note 9, 48-49, 51, 53. See generally 
HAGGARD & NOLAND, supra note 13. 
21. See, e.g., Rep. of the comm'n of inquiry, supra note 9. 
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two Koreas. 22 Orascom, an Egyptian company, began a mobile service part-
nership with the North Korean government in December 2011, and is en-
joying a monopolistic position to meet communication demand of more 
than 2 million cell phone users.
23 
It is a well-known fact that North Koreans are now participating in 
their own version of capitalism at more than 300 jangmadang,or markets 
throughout the country. 24 Pyongyang sought to restructure its economy 
through the measures of July 1, 2002, which allowed surplus production 
over the quota assigned by the state. The government backtracked, how-
ever, when it felt the threat of burgeoning private initiatives. In November 
2009, the North Korean government ordered the currency reform, whereby 
old money was to be exchanged with new currency at the rate of 100 to I. 
The policy was supplemented by a ban on use of foreign exchange and a 
crackdown on markets. 
This misguided attempt by the government to reassert itself failed, 
however, as it caused hyperinflation and hoarding of Chinese yuan and U.S. 
dollar. 25 In February 2010, the government allowed circulation of foreign 
currency and opening of large markets again. Pyongyang henceforth imple-
mented policies such as the June 28 measures in 2012 and the May 30 
22. Construction started in June 2003, and was completed in October 2007. At the 
end of December 2010, 121 enterprises maintained manufacturing facilities there, and 
employed more than 46,000 North Korean workers. The industrial zone's turbulent his-
tory reflected the relationship between the two countries. The operation was suspended 
or disrupted, with withdrawal of some or all of the South Korean workers from the 
zone, after the sinking of Cheonan warship in March 2010, the bombing of Yeonpyeong 
island in November 2010, and in April 2013 when Pyongyang's military threat reached 
new heights. The operation was eventually restored after each incident, until it was 
completely shut down after North's launch of a rocket in February 2016. 
23. See Martyn Williams, Orascom has $422 million in cash in North Korea, N. 
KOREA TECH (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.northkoreatech.org/2013/12/16/orascom-
has-422-million-in-cash-in-north-korea; Over 2 Million N. Koreans Have Mobile 
Phones, CHOSUN ILBO (ENG. ED.) (Aug. 5, 2013), http://english.choson.com/svc/news/ 
printContent.htmi. 
24. Jangmadanginitially began as a small market where farmers sold extraneous 
agricultural commodities and other goods. In the 1990s, however, people came to rely 
on market to supplement the lower income they earned from state enterprises. Pyongy-
ang officially recognized jonghapsijang (general market) after the measures of July 1, 
2002. Today, food, shoes, clothes, electrical devices, and other sundry goods from 
China, Japan, and South Korea are freely traded at the market. Sellers and purchasers 
move far more efficiently than they ever did at state-owned enterprises. 
25. Foreign currency is exchanged as de factor currency at markets, as residents 
do not trust in the value of North Korean won. See James Pearson, North Korea'sBlack 
Market Becoming the New Normal, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-northkorea-change-insight-idUSKCNOSN0320151029. 
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measures in 2014, which permitted enterprises to keep a share of what they 
produced after paying off the state.2 6 As will be explained below, DPRK 
now is a scene of "a quiet revolution" where businesses are run by entrepre-
neurs with profit motives. 
2 
In North Korea, the political structure inherited from the Kim Il-sung 
era is essentially intact. Kim Jong-un is the supreme commander, and the 
WPK is the only political party with power. Unlike in other Stalinist coun-
tries, DPRK generated a dynasty with power transfer occurring within the 
Kim family. The country as a whole is faring badly, and discontent is sim-
mering underground, but Kim is audaciously wielding his power. The prop-
aganda machine pumping out the personality cult of Great Leader and Dear 
Leader is still in high gear. People may whisper in private their frustration 
with the government, but a revolt, small or large, would be ruthlessly put 
down. 
With its relatively well-educated labor force, location in the hub of 
East Asia, plentiful underground resources, a track record of industrial de-
velopment, 28 and the populace already learning the ropes of capitalism, 
North Korea has a potential to lift itself out of underdevelopment. Political 
liberalization would empower it to reduce the poverty rate, upgrade out-
dated infrastructure, become better integrated with the global economy, and 
join other emerging nations in achieving fast economic growth. 
Ill. RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS LEGALLY GUARANTEED IN 
NORTH KOREA 
Protection of human rights may be a culturally relative value,29 but 
DPRK is a signatory to many international human rights treaties. Pyongy-
ang joined the UN on September 17, 1991, together with South Korea, and 
is therefore a party to the UN Charter, which encourages respect for funda-
mental rights. North Korea also complied with international protocols such 
26. The DPRK state allowed an independent accounting system (dongnip 
chaesanje) beginning in the 1960s, which gave entities some control over their own 
operations. Such policies were limited, however, as the country remained essentially 
centrally planned at least until the 1980s. See Bukhan jisik sajeon, supra note 17. 
27. See Stephen Evans, A Quiet Revolution in North Korea, BBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30812237. 
28. Until the early 1990s, the North Korean government periodically announced 
multi-year development plans to increase production of coal, automobiles, machines, 
steel, and other commodities. As was the case in USSR and other communist countries, 
Pyongyang successfully industrialized the country in the 1960s. 
29. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES (1997). 
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as submitting reports to UN committees under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other treaties. 
30 
TABLE 1. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES SIGNED BY 
NORTH KOREA' 
Treaty Joined in Entered into forcei
in 
International Covenant on Economic. September 1981 December 1981 
Social, and Cultural Rights 
ICCPR September 1981 December 1981 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and November 1984 February 1985 
Crimes Against Humanity 
Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment Of the Crime of Genocide anuary 1989 May 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child September 1990 October 1990 
Convention on Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women February 2001 March 2001 
'CHAN-(;YU KIM AND GYU-CHANG Lai. BUKHAN GUKI'IlWO YFONKU (Study on International Laws in 
North Korea) (2009). 
The DPRK government itself officially espouses the value of human 
rights. As a matter of fact, North Korea was founded on the principle of 
welfare and egalitarianism under proletariat ideals. Article 65 of the social-
ist constitution proclaims that citizens shall enjoy equal rights in all fields 
of national social life. 31 Kim Il-sung was said to have wimin-icheon as his 
motto, which decrees that a head of a state should uphold his subjects as 
heaven. Kim's mission apparently was to build a strong nation which would 
take it upon itself to look after people's well-being. 
30. See Bo-hyuk Suh, Controversies over North Korean Human Rights in South 
Korea Society, 31 ASIAN PERSP. 23, 25 (2007). 
31. DONG HAN KIM, MIGUK-Ul BUKHAN-IN'GWON-BEOP-GWA BUKHAN-UI 
IN'GWON-GWANRYEON-BEOPJE-UI BIGYO-BUNSEOK (Comparative Analysis of North Ko-
rea Human Rights Act in the U.S. and the Human Rights-Related Laws in North Korea) 
(2005). 
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TABLE 2. BASIC RIGHTS OF CITIZENS UNDER THE SOCIALIST 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA 
Article 66 Rights to vote, to be elected 
Article 67 Freedom of assembly and press 
Article 68 Freedom of faith 
Article 69 Right to a legal action 
Article 72 Right to free medical care 
Article 73 Right to education 
Article 74 Freedom of science, literature, and art 
Article 75 Freedom of residence and travel 
Article 77 Women's equality 
IV. INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS 
A. United Nations 
Repatriation of North Korean refugees, malnutrition, political impris-
onment, and other plights have been a recurrent question at the UN. The 
first resolution at the UN against human rights violations in North Korea 
was at the Sub-commission on Human Rights in August 1997.32 Since 
2006, the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions on North Korean 
human rights at every session.33 In March 2013, the UN organized the Com-
mission of Inquiry (COI) to probe into DPRK's human rights record. COI 
spent several months conducting public hearings with more than 80 North 
Korean refugees and other witnesses in Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Wash-
ington. In February 2014, the commission published one of the most com-
prehensive reports on North Korean human rights. The report describes 
some of the inhumanity perpetrated by the DPRK government, and advised 
that the Security Council refer the situation to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), or an ad hoc tribunal at the UN.34 
32. DEUG KEE AHN, KUKJE-SAHOE-WA BUKHAN-IN'GWON: HYEONHWANG, 
JAENGJEOM, GWAJE (International Community and North Korean Human Rights: Cur-
rent Status, Controversies, and Tasks) (2011). 
33. In July 2004, the Commission on Human Rights appointed Vitit Muntarbhorn, 
a human rights scholar, as a rapporteur on human rights in North Korea. Muntarbhorn's 
request to be allowed entry into the country and have meetings with DPRK officials 
was repeatedly denied, however. 
34. Michael Kirby, a former Australian judge who chaired the COI, compared the 
violence committed by Pyongyang to that by the Nazi Germany and Pol Pot's Cambo-
dia. Peter Walker, North Korea Human Rights Abuses Resemble Those of the Nazis, 
Says UN Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2014/feb/I 7/north-korea-human-rights-abuses-united-nations/. 
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TABLE 3. RESOLUTIONS AT UN DENOUNCING HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 2 
General Assembly 
60th, 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th 
Commission on Human Rights 
59th, 60th, 61st 
Human Rights Council 
7th, 10th, 13th, 16th, 19th, 22nd, 25th, 28th 
2-See U.N. North Korea Human Rights Issues Discussion Database, MINISTRY oF FORIIGN AFFAIRS, 
http://www.mofa.go.kr/trade/hunanrights/diplomacy/northkorea/index.jsp?menu=M-30 70_70&tab 
menu=T_2 (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
In November 2014, the Third Committee of the General Assembly 
adopted a resolution which also recommended referring the situation to an 
ICC trial. A trial at the ICC would be momentous in that it would be closely 
covered by media from around the world. The indictment and the convic-
tion would be extremely embarrassing to those found guilty, even if they 
cannot physically be arrested and imprisoned, and the news would reach 
ears of North Koreans, too.
35 
B. United States 
1. NKHRA in the United States 
The George W. Bush administration challenged Pyongyang, a member 
of the axis of evil, on all controversies including human rights, and the 
legislations reflected such presidential position. In October 2002, Senator 
Sam Brownback presented the North Korean Refugee Relief Act (NK-
RRA), which allowed those fleeing North Korea to seek asylum protection 
in the U.S. Brownback introduced it again on June 25, 2003, the anniver-
sary of the start of the Korean War in 1950, and the bill passed both cham-
bers a month later. 
In November of the same year, Brownback and Evan Bayh felt a need 
for a law with a broader coverage, and came up with the North Korean 
Freedom Act (NKFA). Representative Jim Leach initiated a bill with the 
35. South Koreans ordinarily refer to people living in DPRK as "North Korean 
residents" (bukhan jumin), as opposed to "North Korean nationals" or "North Korean 
citizens." Under Article 3 of the South Korean constitution, the territory of the Republic 
of Korea consists of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands. DAEHANMINKUK 
HEONBEOB [CONSTITUTION] art. 3 (S. Kor.). The term "North Korean residents" implies 
that North Korea is part of South Korea as opposed to another country. 
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same name in the House. In March 2004, Leach introduced the North Ko-
rean Human Rights Act, a modified version of the NKRRA, and the bill 
passed the Senate and the House in September and October 2004, respec-
tively, with bipartisan support. 
36 
TABLE 4. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NORTH KOREA HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT IN THE UNITED STATES3 
Senators Brownback and Bayh proposed the North KoreanNovember 2003 Freedom Act. 
November 2003 Representative Jim Leach introduced the North KoreanFreedom Act. 
16 congresspersons led by Leach unveiled the North Korea 
March 2004 Human Rights Act, which modified the bill which Leach 
himself had initiated 
The bill passed the International Relations Committee inthe House by unanimous vote. 
July 2004 The House passed the bill by voice vote. 
The Senate modified the House bill, and ratified it bySeptember 2004 unanimous vote. 
The House passed the modified Senate bill, again withOctober 2004 unanimous vote. 
October 2004 President Bush signed the bill. 
President Bush signed the North Korean Human RightsReauthorization Act. 
President Obama signed the North Korean Human RightsReauthorization Act, extending its effectiveness until 2017. 
3Prepared by Dong Han Kim. 
The U.S. NKHRA contains findings on the human rights situation in 
38 North Korea.37 Its programs relate to support for democracy programs, 
radio transmission to North Korea,39 appointment of an envoy on human 
rights,40 monitoring assistance to North Korea, 41 and protection of North 
Korean refugees. 42 
On the international front, the law advocates a regional human rights 
dialogue, 43 requests the Chinese government to give UN workers "unim-
36. The role of North Korea Freedom Coalition among other religious human 
rights groups was substantial in gathering support for the law. 
37. North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 4011, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004). 
38. Id. § 102. 
39. Id. § 103. 
40. Id. § 107. 
41. Id. § 202. 
42. Id. §§ 301-03. 
43. Id. § 106. 
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peded access" to North Koreans in China,44 and makes recommendations 
for the UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees. 45 Government budget is 
allocated for human rights programs 46 and promotion of freedom of infor-
mation. 47 The law further directs the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to submit annual reports to congressional committees. 4"
The law was reauthorized in 2008 and in 2012 to extend duration of the 
measures set forth in the 2004 Act. 
2. Other Laws in the United States 
In addition to the law on North Korean human rights, Congress passed 
a number of other legislations on international human rights. We will sur-
vey those laws below, to put NKHRA in the U.S. and South Korea in 
perspective.
49 
a. Cuban Democracy Act 
Popularly known as Torricelli Act, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 
mandates economic sanctions on the Cuban government. Among such dis-
ciplinary measures are sanctions against countries aiding Cuba,s° prohibi-
tions on entry into a port in the U.S. by a ship with Cuban interest,51 and 
limitations on remittances to Cuba.52 The law also allowed Washington to 
support individuals and organizations working for peaceful democratic 
change in Cuba.53 The law does not prohibit the donation of food, 
medicines, and other medical supplies to the country. 
54 
44. Id. § 304(a)(1). 
45. Id. §§ 304(a)(2)(5). 
46. Id. § 102. 
47. Id. § 104. 
48. Id. § 305. 
49. YONG-CHEON KIM, MIKUK-UM 2004-NYEON BUKHAN-IN'GWON-BEOP JEJEONG 
UIMl-WA HANBANDO PYEONGHWA BANG'AN MOSAEK: JIPKWON 2-KI BUSI HAENGJEONG-
BU-U] DAEBUK-JEONGCHAEK JEONMANG-EUL JUNGSIM-EURO (A search for plan about the 
peace of the Korean peninsula and the meaning of establishing a North Korean Human 
Rights Act of 2004). 
50. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 6003(b), 106 Stat. 
2575 (1992) (codified at 22 U.S.C.S. ch. 69, § 6003(b) (1993)). 
51. Id. § 6005(b). 
52. Id. § 6005(c). 
53. Id. § 6004(g). 
54. Id. §§ 6004(b), (c), (e), (f). 
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b. Cuban Liberty and DemocraticSolidarity Act 
After the Cuban government shot down two aircrafts operated by 
Brothers to the Rescue, an organization assisting Cuban refugees, in 1996, 
Washington countered with the Cuban Liberty Democratic Solidarity Act, 
also known as the Helms-Burton Act. Helms-Burton's provisions concerned 
(1) expanding international sanctions against the Fidel Castro regime,5 5 (2) 
catalyzing the transition to democracy in Cuba,56 (3) protecting rights of 
U.S. nationals, whose property was confiscated by the Cuban government, 57 
and (4) expelling from the U.S. an alien who confiscated or trafficked prop-
erty of U.S. nationals. 58 The law allows filing of an action in the U.S. for 
wrongful deprivation of property. 59 It further declares that the sanctions 
cannot be lifted until a democratically elected government is installed in 
Cuba.6
0 
The law's aggressiveness provoked protests from other countries. The 
EU considered referring the U.S. to a panel at the World Trade Organiza-
tion over the extra-territorial application of the law. In its disapproval of the 
law, the U.K. government sent Baroness Symons, Under Secretary of State, 
to Cuba in October 1998, and urged its European partners to act against the 
law. 6 1 The General Assembly adopted resolutions every year since the early 
1990s requesting the U.S. end its blockade against Cuba, and requesting the 
adoption of resolutions continued after the enactment of Helms-Burton. 62 
c. Iran Democracy Act (IDA) 
IDA, legislated in 2003, is a brief law with just four sections. It spon-
sors democratic initiatives in Iran such as Radio Farda programming, and 
distributes grants to organizations putting together media materials for rule 
of law in Iran.
63 
55. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-114, tit. 1, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C.S. tit. 1 ((1996) [hereinafter 
Helms-Burton Act]. 
56. Id. tit. 2. 
57. Id. tit. 3. 
58. Id. tit. 4. 
59. Id. § 302(a)(4). 
60. Id. §§ 201(14), 204(c). 
61. MICK HILLYARD & VAUGHNE MILLER, CUBA AND THE HELMS-BURTON ACT 
29 (1998). 
62. See generally id. 
63. Iran Democracy Act of 2003, S. 1082, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003). 
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d. Iraq LiberationAct (ILA) 
ILA, ratified in 1998, directs the president to select a democratic oppo-
sition group against Saddam Hussein. 64 It further provides for a war crimes 
tribunal 65 and supports a transition to democracy in the country. 66 Explicitly 
authorized are military spending and a subsidy of up to $97 million to fund 
67 
insurgent groups. 
TABLE 5. CONTENTS OF NKHRA IN THE UNITED STATES, HELMS-
BURTON, IDA AND ILA
4 
Regime change 
* NKHRA: Reunification of the Korean peninsula under democracy
5 
* Helms-Burton: Driving out the Fidel Castro government 
* IDA: Achieving transparent and complete democracy' 
• ILA: Overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime7 
Subversive operation 
* NKHRA: Grants to organizations promoting "democracy, rule of law, and the 
development of a market economy" in North Korea' 
- Helms-Burton: Support for democratic groups in Cuba" 
- ILA: Military appropriation of up to $97,000,000"' 
Economic sanction 
* Helms-Burton: Blockade against Cuba, limitation on foreign companies doing business 
with Cuba 
Anti-regime media 
* NKHRA: Goal of broadcasting 12 hours a day to North Korea" 
Marti' 2 " Helms-Burton: Television 
" IDA: Radio Farda 
3 
* ILA: Grant to organizations for radio and television broadcasting 
4Prepared by Dong Han Kim.
5North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 401 I, 108th Cong. § 4(5) (2004). 
'Iran Democracy Act of 2003, S. 1082. 108th Cong. § 3(1) (2003).7Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, H.R. 4655, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998). 
'North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004. H.R. 4011, 108th Cong. § 102(a) (2004). 
'Helms Burton Act § 109. 
'Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, H.R. 4655. 105th Cong. § 4(a)(2)(B) (1998). 
"North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 401 I, 108th Cong. § 103(a) (2004). 
'2Helms Burton Act § 107.
"3Iran Democracy Act of 2003. S. 1082, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003). 
'Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, H.R. 4655, 105th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (1998). 
The enactment of these laws predictably intensified anti-American 
sentiments in target countries. Washington has been in conflict with these 
countries long before these laws were promulgated. The legislations paral-
64. Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, H.R. 4655, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998). 
65. Id. § 6. 
66. Id. §§ 4, 7. 
67. Id. § 4. 
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leled existing U.S. policies toward those states, and must be understood in 
the context of such political dynamics. 
68 
C. Japan 
The official title of the North Korean Human Rights Act in Japan is the 
Act to Address Abduction and Other Issues Relating to Human Rights In-
fringement by the North Korean Government. 69 The legislation with eight 
clauses is of narrower scope when compared to U.S. law. The law addresses 
repatriation of abductees, an issue which had long frustrated Japan's rela-
tionship with DPRK.70 It prescribes protection of North Korean refugees, 
and cooperation with domestic and international entities, 71 establishes the 
Korean human rights week, 72 and instructs the government to submit to the 
National Diet73 an annual report on state efforts to resolve the abduction 
74
issue. 
There have also been other endeavors by the Japanese government. In 
March 2014, Japan and the EU jointly submitted to the UN Human Rights 
Council a draft resolution proposing referral of the situation in North Korea 
to the ICC.75 Tokyo also enforced sanctions on North Korea such as an 
embargo and travel ban, which went through a cycle of tightening and soft-
ening based on the relationship between the two countries.76 
68. Bert Hoffmann, The Helms-Burton Law and Its Consequencesfor Cuba, the 
UnitedStates and Europe(1998), http:/lasa.international.pitt.edulasa98/hoffmann.pdf.; 
KIM, supra note 52. 
69. Racchi-mondai sono-hoka kita-chousen-toukyoku-niyoru jinken-sin'gai-
mondai-heno taisho-ni kansuru houritsu. The law passed the House of Representatives 
and the House of Councillors in June 2006. A revised law passed both chambers in June 
2007. 
70. Tokyo maintains that North Korean government seized hundreds of Japanese 
civilians in the 1970s and 1980s, to use them in training North Korean spies in Japanese 
language and culture. Pyongyang and Tokyo disagree over whether the DPRK govern-
ment freed all those who had been kidnapped. 
71. Outline of North Korea Human Rights Act art. 6, N. KOREA HUM. RTS. RES. 
CTR., https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Japan-NKHRA-2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 
2016). 
72. Id. art. 4. 
73. Kokkai. 
74. Outline of North Korea Human Rights Act art. 6, supra note 85. 
75. Hum. Rts. Council, Human rights situations that require the Council's atten-
tion, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/L.17 (March 26, 2014). The draft resolution was subse-
quently approved at the General Assembly in December 2014. 
76. For example, after Pyongyang announced creation of a committee to investi-
gate the kidnappings in July 2014, the Japanese government eased restriction on travel 
and money transfer. Reiji Yoshida, Economic sanctionsagainst North Korea partially 
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D. European Union 
The EU, one of the donors to DPRK, also tried to engage North Korea 
in human rights. As mentioned above, the EU sponsored resolutions in the 
General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, and adopted autono-
mous resolutions. EU also held "political dialogues" with DPRK through-
out the 2000s. The release of the COI report prompted Pyongyang to act as 
it dispatched Kang Seok-ju, WPK secretary, to Brussels in September 2014. 
It also invited Stavros Lambrinidis, the human rights representative of the 
EU, to the country. 
Have such transnational processes generated tangible results? Interna-
tional treaties depend largely on voluntary compliance, and resolutions do 
not have a legally binding force. Even an ICC decision convicting Kim 
Jong-un would not be enforceable, unless Kim voluntarily subjects himself 
to the authority of the ICC. The effect of economic and other sanctions is 
questionable 77 , as Pyongyang continues to ignore international outcries 
against the country.78 Short of throwing out the North Korean regime with 
military power, there does not appear to be much the international commu-
nity can do about DPRK's human rights. What difference would NKHRA 
make, now that it became a law in South Korea? 
V. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND POLITICAL BICKERING 
Hannara Party and its successor, Saenuri Party, proposed bills at every 
Assembly since the 17th National Assembly. Representative Hwang Jin-ha 
was the main sponsor of the legislations at the 17th, 18th, and 19th Assem-
bly, and Yun Sang-hyeon, at the 18th and 19th Assembly. Jo Myeong-
lifted, JAPAN TIMES (Jul. 4, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/04/nation 
al/politics-diplomacy/sanctions-loosened-agai nst-north-korea/#.VdvF I33cDFk. 
77. For example, Executive Order 1355 1, which was signed after sinking of Che-
onan navy ship in March 2010, broadened restrictions under Executive Order 13466 of 
June 2008 on money laundering, arms trade, and other "illicit and deceptive activities in 
international markets." Exec. Order No. 13,551, 75 C.F.R. § 169 (2010). Refer to the 
Treasury website for a list of sanctions against the country. Resource Center: North 
Korea Sanctions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/pages/nkorea.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2016). 
78. In April 2016, Ri Su Yong, North Korea's foreign minister, said his country 
would halt its nuclear tests only if South Korea stops military exercise with the U.S. 
Security Council Resolution 2270 gained approval by China and Russia, North Korea's 
traditional allies, but it is uncertain how strictly the two countries will enforce the sanc-
tions. More importantly, the sanctions won't serve their purpose if they cause hardships 
to ordinary individuals in North Korea, the very subjects which the sanctions are de-
signed to help. 
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cheol, a North Korean refugee himself, offered a bill in the 19th Assembly. 
After the submission, however, the bills gathered dust on the shelf of the 
legislature, except when they became a subject of sporadic deliberation.79 
NKHRA somewhat gained impetus with the publication of the COI report, 
but it was Pyongyang's missile testing in early 2016, which catalyzed the 
bill's passage in March 2016. 
In South Korea, liberals are traditionally pro-North, while conserva-
tives take a hard line. A bill taking Pyongyang on human rights therefore is 
bound to be a lot more contentious than a bill on inter-Korean cooperation 
or a law publishing a unified dictionary, for instance. Resistance had been 
fierce, as when Democratic Party80 put NKHRA on the list of bills it vowed 
to obstruct during the interim Assembly session in December 2008. 
TABLE 6. LEAD SPONSORS OF NKHRA1
5 
17th Assembly (June 5, 2004 - May 29, 2008) 
June 2005 Hwang Jin-ha (Hannara) 
August 2005 Kim Mun-su (Hannara) 
18th Assembly (May 30, 2008 - May 29, 2012) 
July 2008 Hwang Wu-yeo (Hannara) 
July 2008 Hwang Jin-ha (Hannara) 
November 2008 Hong II-pyo (Hannara) 
December 2008 Yun Sang-hyeon (Hannara) 
19th Assembly (May 30, 2012 - May 29, 2016) 
YOUNG-SUN CHUNG, BUKHAN-IN'GWON-BEOP"-E I)AHAN IN'GWONJEOK GOCHAL (Study on the North 
June 2012 Yun Sang-hyeon (Saenuri) 
June 2012 Hwang Jin-ha (Saenuri) 
August 2012 Lee In-je (AUP) 
September 2012 Jo Myeong-cheol (Saenuri) 
March 2013 Sim Yun-jo (Saenuri) 
November 2014 Kim Yeong-wu (Saenuri) 
5 
Korean Human Rights Act from the Human Rights Perspective); JONG-su KiM, DAUHUK-JEONGCHAhK 
SUHAENG- ISS'EO KUKHOE-YIOKHAI JEGO-BANG'AN YFONKU (Reconsideration of the National Assem-
bly's Role in the Implementation of Policy towards North Korea). 
79. The bills lapsed when the term of the respective Assembly came to an end. 
80. Minju-dang. 
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September 2009 Song Min-sun (Democratic Party) 
September 2009 Kang Ki-gap (Democratic Labor Party) 
June 2011 Kim Dong-cheol (Democratic Party) 
19th Assembly 
November 2012 Jeong Cheong-rae (Democratic United Party) 1 
July 2013 Yun Hu-deok (Democratic Party) 
September 2013 In Jae-keun (Democratic Party) 
November 2013 Sim Jae-kwon (Democratic Party) 
7 
April 2014 Sim Jae-kwon (NPAD) 
'The bill concerned providing humanitarian assistance to infants in North Korea. 
"The bill was on helping pregnant women and children in the country. 
TABLE 8. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTIES THAT PROPOSED NKHRA 
Hannara Party' 8 
Hannara Party, established in November 1997 by the merger of two parties, was the major 
right-wing party. It was a minority in the 17th Assembly when it won 121 seats in the 2004 
election. It became the majority party in the 18th Assembly, after it picked up 153 seats." 
2'1Saenuri Party 
Hannara Party changed the name to Saenuri Party in February 2012. It won the majority in 
the April 2012 election, with 152 seats. 
Advancement and Unification Party
2' 
Right-leaning AUP, established in February 2008 as Liberty Forward Party,
22 acquired 18 
seats in the 2008 election. The party changed its name to AUP in May 2012, after it only 
captured 5 seats in the election a month earlier. The party was eventually absorbed into 
Saenuri in November 2012. 
'nannara-dang. 
''The National Assembly members consist of (I) those elected in their district and (2) those who did not 
run in a district, but are nominated by a party (birve daepyo) for nation-wide representation. A voter 
casts two votes, (1) one for a district candidate and (2) the other for a party which he favors for national 
representation. National representation seats are distributed in proportion to the number of votes the 
party won therefor. The National Assembly determines the number of the total legislative seats. The 
election in 2008 produced 299 representatives, 245 elected in the districts and 54 nation-wide, whereas 
the April 2012 election yielded 300 representatives, 246 elected in the districts, 54 nation-wide. Under 
Article 109 of Kukhoe-beop (National Assembly Act), the proceedings generally are to be voted on in 
the presence of a majority of all incumbent National Assembly members, and by a vote of a majority of 
the members present. The number of incumbents often falls below the number at the beginning of the 




BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22 




Uri Party, established in November 2003 with members from an array of parties, became the 
majority party in the 17th Assembly after it won 152 seats. Most members of the party 
joined the United Democratic Party24 in February 2008. 
Democratic Party 
There have been several political parties in South Korea, with the title of Democratic Party. 
The party which used the name in the 18th Assembly was founded in February 2008 with 
union of two parties, under the name of United Democratic Party. The party secured 81 seats 
in the election in April 2008, and changed its name to Democratic Party in July of the same 
year. The party was dissolved in December 2011 when it joined with the Citizens Unity 
Party 25 and others to form Democratic United Party.26 Democratic United Party won 127 
seats in the 19th National Assembly election. The old name was recycled when the party 
changed itself to Democratic Party in May 2013. 
New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD)
2 7 
NPAD was founded in March 2014, as Democratic Party united with the political force of 
An Cheol-su, an IT entrepreneur-turned-politician. NPAD was renamed The Minjoo Party of 
Korea 8 in December 2015, after An and his followers left NPAD. 
Democratic Labor Party
29 
Democratic Labor Party was an ultra-left party founded in January 2000. It won 5 seats in 








A. 17th National Assembly 
Presidency changed hands from liberal Roh Moo-hyun to conservative 
Lee Myung-bak in February 2008 during the 17th National Assembly. In 
the wake of the enactment of NKHRA in the U.S. and Japan and the nuclear 
experiment by Pyongyang in October 2006, voices were raised at the Na-
tional Assembly to promulgate a similar law in South Korea. Representative 
Hwang Jin-ha, a former military officer, first introduced NKHRA in June 
2005, broadly patterned on NKHRA in the U.S. Hwang's bill was followed 
by a legislation by Representative Kim Mun-su two months later. Kim's bill 
was scheduled for discussion at the committee a year after submission in 
September 2006, but Hwang's bill was never even scheduled. The strong 
stance of Uri Party, which was the majority party at the time, against the 
bills prevented them from making their way out of FAUC. 
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B. 18th National Assembly 
In the 18th session, conservative Hannara Party acquired the majority 
of seats in the National Assembly, and a legislative environment was cre-
ated more conducive to the passage of NKIRA. Four congresspersons from 
Hannara served as chief sponsors of NKHRA. The bills by the legislators 
were adjusted and combined into one representative act, which was ap-
proved at FAUC in February 2010.81 The bill was subsequently sent to Leg-
islation and Judiciary Committee (LJC),82 but could not sail over political 
gridlock. 
The liberal parties, while acknowledging the severity of human rights 
violations in North Korea, produced their own humanitarian laws. The bills 
by Representative Song Min-sun were focused on amending the existing 
law on supporting North Korean escapees, while the legislation by Kang 
Ki-gap centered on sending rice to the North. These proposed laws, how-
ever, omitted institutions such as the committee and foundation to hold Py-
ongyang accountable. 
C. 19th NationalAssembly 
In November 2014, the FAUC assigned the bills from Saenuri and 
NPAD respectively, to its subcommittee responsible for reviewing bills. 
Kim Yeong-wu was the primary sponsor of the bill which consolidated a 
number of bills put forth by his Saenuri colleagues. Sim Jae-kwon, a NPAD 
lawmaker, originated the bill from his party. The Sim Jae-kwon bill was 
viewed as embracing the centrist position within the party. It went so far as 
to label promotion of North Korean human rights as Seoul's responsibility, 
require the South Korean government to carry out a human rights dialogue, 
and create an advisory board on human rights dialogue, a council on aid, 
and a human rights information center. The bill, however, did not feature 
human rights foundation, policy, or data center, and does not ask for trans-
parency from Pyongyang on its distribution of donated goods. 
The Assembly eventually passed NKHRA on March 2, 2016, with 212 
in favor, 24 in abstention of 236 in presence. On February 10, the last day 
of the Lunar New Year holiday, the Assembly issued, by 243 in favor and 5 
in abstention, a resolution denouncing the DPRK's rocket launch on Febru-
ary 7. The bill received approval of both FAUC and LJC on February 26, 
81. The bill received 14 votes from members of Hannara and 2 votes from Liberty 
Forward Party. Democratic Party members had exited the room in protest before voting 
commenced. 
82. Beopje-sabeop-wiwonhoe. 
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after Saenuri and The Minjoo leaderships struck a deal.83 The passed law 
accommodated most of the provisions of the bills previously introduced at 
the Assembly, after only a minor dispute on phrasing of a provision. Such 
an accelerated pace is extraordinary, given the sluggish progress it had been 
making since the mid-2000s. The political climate was such that parties, 
left- and right-wing, had no choice but to rage at DPRK's reckless rocket 
launch earlier in the year. 
D. PartisanPolitics 
The challenges NKHRA faced at the Assembly should be understood 
in the context of its legislative politics. North Korea provides an ideological 
and political battleground between liberals and conservatives in South Ko-
rea. Labor activists, socialists, and others on the far left of the political 
spectrum do not opt for any inquiry into human rights situation in DPRK. 
Conversely, North Korean defector associations are among the most active 
proponents of NKHRA. Such disputes were replicated at the National As-
sembly, and the stalemate has been very difficult to break through. NKHRA 
was able to reach LJC in the 18th Assembly. LJC assesses legal technicali-
ties of a proposed act, after policy impacts are discussed at a primary-level 
committee. NKHRA should therefore have been forwarded to the plenary 
session in due course after the bill's constitutionality and other matters are 
reviewed, but such submission did not happen in the 18th Assembly.84 
Rightist coalitions host seminars, workshops, and rallies to insist on 
ratification. According to conservatives, it is ironic for leftist liberals, who 
claim to champion human rights, to attack NKHRA. Some of the 
lawmakers who disagreed with NKHRA had been persecuted for protesting 
against military rule in South Korea in the 1980s. Now they fought against 
the law that seeks to banish the tyranny in the north. Right wingers further 
stressed that the humanitarian bills prepared by NPAD represent yet another 
effort to aid Pyongyang unconditionally without first trying to have it an-
swer for its misconduct. 
83. The interim session itself, during which NKHRA was enacted, was marked by 
more than 190 hours of filibustering by The Minjoo, as the party protested at Terror 
Prevention Act (tereo bangji-beop), which the party argued would be used by govern-
ment intelligence to infringe on civil liberty. NKHRA itself was classified as one of the 
"non-controversial" bills, as the parties generally consented to its passage. 
84. Namhan-ui bukhan-in'gwon-beop nonran (Controversies surrounding the 
North Korean Human Rights Act in South Korea), RADIO FREE ASIA (Jul. 5, 2011), 
http://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly-program/ad81 aeO8c99d-d480c5b4c90db2c8b2e4/ 
askquestion-070520111701 00.html. 
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NPAD's position, on the other hand, was that any solution to the 
human rights problems in North Korea must be predicated on accepting 
DPRK's sovereignty. Lee Hae-chan, as a Democratic United Party legisla-
tor in June 2012, contended that NKHRA constitutes "diplomatic discour-
tesy" toward the North. Pak Ji-won, as he was stepping down from one of 
the key positions at the Democratic Party in May 2011, professed his pride 
in having thwarted NKHRA at the Assembly. NPAD further said that NK-
HRA constitutes a veiled attempt by the right-wing government to channel 
more funding to organizations with similar ideological leanings, and would 
not make much contribution to human rights in North Korea. 
In January 2015, Yu Ki-jun, a Sanueri lawmaker and a chairman of 
FAUC, offered that for NKHRA to move forward, a top-level body between 
the parties needed to be formed. Such body will help sidestep political dif-
ferences, and enable the legislation, he argued. The disparities between the 
two sides have not diminished, however, and a deliberative session at 
FAUC over NKHRA generally went no further than confirming again the 
unyielding grounds of the two sides.
85 
The legislative procedures such as submission ex officio by the Assem-
bly chairman or through "fast track" have been suggested, but were not well 
received. In 2011, Hannara Party entertained the option of sending the bill 
to the plenary session ex officio by the power of the National Assembly 
chairman. 86 The fast-track provision of Article 85-2 of the National Assem-
bly Act also specifies a mechanism for bringing a bill automatically to the 
plenary session. 87 In January 2015, however, Yu Ki-jun argued against des-
ignation of NKHRA for expeditious processing. At the time, FAUC had 14 
Saenuri Party members and 9 NPAD members. Saenuri could therefore 
have set NKHRA up for expeditious processing, if all its members at the 
committee voted in favor. Even if NKHRA secured such designation and 
85. In 2011, Democratic Party contemplated the possibility of combining contents 
of bills from both Hannara and Democratic Party. Hannara did not accept it, however, 
on the ground that such integration will interfere with core substance of its bills. 
86. Kim Mu-seong, buk-in'gwon-beop jeil keorowoe, jikkwon sangieong gomin 
(Kim Mu-seong said NKHRA deeply troubled him, and he was mulling submission ex 
officio), DAILY NK, http://www.dailynk.comkorean/read.php?catald=nk02600&num 
=90281 (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
87. If a committee other than LJC fails to finish the examination of an agenda 
designated for expeditious disposition within 180 days from the date of such designa-
tion, the agenda is automatically referred to LJC. Similarly, if LJC does not complete 
examination within 90 days of the designation, it automatically goes to the plenary 
session. To gain such designation, an agenda needs affirmative votes of 3/5 of all in-
cumbent National Assembly members or at least 3/5 of all incumbent National Assem-
bly members of the competent committee. 
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arrived at LJC after 180 days at FAUC, however, there was no guarantee 
that the bill would again be reserved for accelerated processing, as the 
membership at LJC was more evenly divided between the left- and right-
wing parties in the 19th Assembly. 
88 
Yu claimed that there was not enough time to fast-track the bill before 
the National Assembly election in April 2016. The majority party was con-
cerned that such legal maneuvers would induce the counterparty to respond 
in kind, and jeopardize bargaining between them regarding other more po-
litically crucial items. NKHRA therefore became a victim of partisan polit-
ics, and a genuine discourse on human rights was hard to come by. 
Likewise, the regulatory framework is already in place in South Korea, 
touching upon much of the important DPRK-related agenda. Civic alliances 
working with North Korean refugees and on human rights are already re-
ceiving state subsidies. The Ministry of Unification is coordinating efforts 
with respect to the transmission of information to North Koreans, interna-
tional collaboration, exchange, education, and so on. The ministry and other 
domestic and international organizations are drawing together data on 
human rights violations. Any flaws in those activities can be remedied 
under the existing legal structure, and for practical purpose, the ratification 
and enforcement of NKHRA are not necessary for those endeavors to 
continue. 
At the same time, the provisions of NKHRA which were not found in 
existing laws, such as those creating the human rights foundation and com-
mittee, were not perceived as having any pragmatic effect. Equally impor-
tant, NKHRA fell in legislative priority for both the ruling party and the 
opposition, even though their rhetoric indicated otherwise. Assembly mem-
bers did not wish to expend their limited political capital on NKHRA, 
whose effect was deemed to be largely symbolic. They are motivated to 
first tackle bills which directly deal with domestic matters. NKHRA there-
fore struggled to receive attention from otherwise busy politicians. 
VI. PROVISIONS 
A. What NKHRA Does Not Involve 
NKHRA is a domestic law with a transnational aspect. It is not an 
international treaty entered into by Seoul and Pyongyang, and it does not 
have a binding force on North Korea. Although the law has profound impli-
cations for inter-Korean relations, extensive discussion thereof or a fact-
88. As of August 2015, LJC was composed of 8 Saenuri and 7 NPAD lawmakers 
and one leftist Justice Party (Jeongui-dang)member. 
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finding provision which explicitly disparages Pyongyang is absent. Extra-
territorial application is not an issue, since it does not refer the situation to a 
domestic or international judicial body, impose an economic or military 
ban, or make demands of Pyongyang. It does not outline a scheme for a 
political or regime change, and no government budget is set aside for a 
dissident group in DPRK.89 In that regard, NKHRA is less intrusive than 
some of the multilateral resolutions or international human rights laws in 
the U.S. 
B. What it Enumerates 
NKHRA enacted on March 2, 2016 integrates most of the common 
contents in the previously proposed bills.90 Laws made by the National As-
sembly only offer general policy direction. Actual implementation is also 
contingent on subordinate decrees, as well as on supervision by the Unifica-
tion Ministry and other bureaus. We nonetheless hould evaluate NKHRA's 
major subject matters for their regulatory and political implication. 
1. Basic Plan for North Korean Human Rights, the Human Rights 
Rapporteur, the Advisory Board, and the Foundation 
NKHRA provides for the advisory board, 91 the foundation, 92 and the 
rapporteur.93 It specifies the composition of the advisory board94 and re-
sponsibilities, 95 operation 96 and governance 97 of the foundation. It also di-
rects Unification Ministry to formulate a basic and an enforcement plan. 
98 
These institutions will be charged with identifying ways to bring about ad-
89. Anti-regime organizations do not exist in North Korea in any event. 
90. SEUNG SHIN LEE, BUKHAN-IN'GWON GWANRYEON-BEOP'AN JUYO-NAEYONG-
GWA JAENGJEOM (North Korean Human Rights Bill: The Main Content and Rising 
Controversies). 
91. Bukhan-in'gwon-beop (North Korea Human Rights Act) art. 5 (2016), http:/f 
likms.assembly.go.kr/nfilegate/servlet/FileGate','AECC6A6E-563F-06A2-B38B-
332B35C3ECF4',' I'. 
92. Id. art. 10. 
93. Id. art. 9(2). The bills lead-sponsored by Yun Sang-hyeon, Hwang Jin-ha, Lee 
In-je, and Jo Myeong-cheol in the 19th Assembly all had the advisory board, the basic 
plan, and the foundation. 
94. Id. art. 5(2). 
95. Id. art. 10(3). 
96. Id. art. I1. 
97. Id. art. 12. 
98. Id. art. 6(2). 
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vancement in human rights, probe actual conditions, conduct research, offer 
education, and assist organizations. 
2. Human Rights Database 
Earlier bills differed on whether North Korean human rights archive 
should be kept at Ministry of Justice, 99 National Human Rights Commis-
sion,100 or a North Korean human rights foundation. The enacted law places 
it at Unification Ministry. 01 Nobody likes to have his wrongdoings memo-
rialized in writing and disclosed to a third party. It is even more terrifying if 
the information so gathered can subsequently be used against them. The 
Unification Ministry and domestic and international non-governmental or-
ganizations are currently collecting the information, and the data bank 
under NKHRA will reinforce such measures. 
In general, testimony of the refugees and other informers cannot be 
validated by an examination of actual situation, as international inspectors 
are not permitted to enter the country, and the movement of aid workers is 
heavily controlled. The testimonies may be erroneous or may even have 
been falsified because of inaccurate memory, or bias of those who chose to 
run away from North Korea under adverse circumstances.' 02 For now, how-
ever, secondary information is pretty much the extent of evidence we have. 
The human rights archive, which was kept in Salzgitter in northern 
Germany, 0 3 has been cited as a model. The documentation center opened in 
October 1961, in reaction to construction of Berlin Wall by East Germany 
two months earlier, with the mission of assembling evidence of human 
rights violations by German Democratic Republic government. Information 
was compiled on mistreatment of prisoners, disappearance of individuals, 
and other incidents of oppression by the East German state. Approximately 
42,000 cases of human rights infringement had been documented when the 
record was handed over to criminal justice authorities after the unification, 
and the center was shut down in 1992.10 4 The rationale was that Federal 
99. Beopmu-bu. 
100. Gukga-in'gwon-wiwonhoe. 
101. Bukhan-in'gwon-beop, art. 13(1), supra note 121. 
102. Those who temporarily stay abroad as diplomats, laborers, and so forth and 
will eventually go back would not be forthcoming with unsavory occurrences inside 
their own country. 
103. ZentraleErfassungsstelleder Landesjustizverwaltungen(Central Archives of 
the Federal Justice Department). 
104. Bukhan-in'gwon-girok-bojonso "bukhan-in'gwon-baekseo" balgan (The 
North Korean Human Rights Archive Publishes "North Korean Human Rights White 
Paper"), RADIO FREE ASIA (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly-program/ 
hrjrights first/fe-mj- 10082013164250.html. 
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Republic of Germany was responsible for prosecution of criminality in East 
Germany too. 
0 5 
To hold the Nuremberg trials after World War 1I, the Allies combed 
through a mountain of Nazi documents. For a legal action against North 
Korean defendants, judges and prosecutors would also need to scrutinize 
state records. The date center maintained by the South Korean government 
will supply valuable supplementary evidence for this "transitional'' to6 justice. 
3. Humanitarian Relief 
A provision on transparency of foreign aid is also included. 07 Aid 
should be given-but not unconditionally. The bill dictates that aid be sup-
plied, distributed, and monitored under international standards. It should 
first be dispensed to pregnant women, children, and other residents who 
need it most, and should not be apportioned for military or other non-hu-
manitarian purpose. 
VII. WHAT NKHRA CAN Do 
A. Pressure on Pyongyang 
One of the purposes of NKHRA is to alert Pyongyang that its acts of 
iniquity won't go unpunished. The North Korean state does not remain 
aloof when it is reproached by foreign observers. In fact, its reaction has 
often been with outrage and hasty denial. North Korea lashed out at the 
North Korea Human Rights Act in the U.S. It called the enactment of the 
0 8law an act of provocation and a product of U.S. hostilities against DPRK. 1 
Pyongyang repeatedly denounced Seoul's attempt to legislate NKHRA, on 
the grounds that such a law would only create conflict among Korean 
people. 
105. Elizabeth A. Lippitt, The Salzgitter Archives: West Germany's Answer to 
East Germany's Human Rights Violations, 15 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147, 156-60 
(1986). 
106. See PAOLO CAMMAROTA ET AL.,, LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA (2007) (The legal memorandum by the U.S.-based 
law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom explores legal approaches. The paper 
discusses referral to the ICC and to the UN Security Council, collaboration with the UN 
Human Rights Council, an action under an international treaty entered into by North 
Korea, and a lawsuit under the Alien Tort Claims Act in the U.S.). 
107. Bukhan-in'gwon-beop, art. 8, supra note 121. 
108. See KIM, supra note 52. 
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"Diplomatic counter-offensive" intensified after the COI report came 
out. 09 Pyongyang answered the report with its own treatise, as well as a 
109-pape report in September 2014 defending its human rights programs.10 
In October 2014, North Korean officials met with Marzuki Darusman, an 
Indonesian lawyer who was a member of the COI, for a possible invitation 
of human rights officials to their country."'I In September 2014, Pyongyang 
sent, for the first time in 15 years, a minister-level official to the UN Gen-
eral Assembly." 12 In November 2014, a week after the UN General Assem-
bly adopted the UN resolution against Pyongyang, the North Korean 
representative office at the UN conveyed to Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon its objection to the resolution." 
3 
DPRK's response shows that it does pay attention to how it is per-
ceived by the global community. Pyongyang is also highly sensitive to Se-
oul's inter-Korean policy. Aid from South was drastically reduced after the 
Yeongpyeong bombing in November 2010. A desperate North Korean gov-
ernment, however, needs all the grains, medications, and cements it can 
obtain from other countries. Demand from other countries on human rights 
therefore would be highly disconcerting. 
B. Changes Within DPRK 
Reflection on North Korean human rights must be accompanied 
through an analysis of changes afoot within the country. Perhaps in spite of 
all its adversities, the North Korean state as it now stands will endure for 
the foreseeable future. Kim Jong-un's DPRK will chug along for decades 
before his successor takes over. News leaked out, however, hinting that 
North Korea is a different place now. North Korea is at a critical juncture, 
109. David Hawk, North Korea Responds to the UN Commission of Inquiry, 38 
NORTH (Oct. 16, 2014), http://38north.org/2014/10/dhawk 101614. 
110. Adam Taylor, North Korea wrote a 53,558-word report on its human rights 
record. The conclusion? It's pretty good, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2014), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/17/north-korea-wrote-a-
53558-word-report-on-its-human-rights-record-the-conclusion-its-pretty-good. 
111. See Kwanwoo Jun, North Korea May Be Planning Human Rights Hoax, 
WALL ST J. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/10/28/north-korea 
-may-be-planning-human-rights-hoax. 
112. See Jung-chul Lee & Inwook Kim, Making Sense of North Korea, Foreign 
Affairs, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.comarticles/east-
asia/2015-01-21/making-sense-north-korea. 
113. Bukhan "In'gwon gyeoluian suyong mothanda," Ban chongjang-e seohan 
(North Korea sent a letter to Secretary General Ban that it can't accept the human rights 
resolution), YEONHAP NEWS, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2014/12/03/ 
0200000000AKR20141203005500072.HTML (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
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as the authoritarian rule is hitting the limit of its power. The European com-
munist bloc melted seemingly instantly. The same phenomenon can take 
place in DPRK. 
The North Korean state did not fall during the famine, largely due to a 
blockage of information from the outside world. Now people are coming to 
grasp that they have been deceived. Below is an overview of upheavals in 
the country, which will have a direct impact on the future of the country and 
its human rights situation. 
1. Gradual Erosion of State Control 
The winds of change blowing in North Korea are making the dictator-
ship face a cold reality. The country has come a long way from when Kim 
Il-sung, Kim Jong-un's grandfather, was in power. During the Cold War, 
North Korea had a great number of those who were dedicated to national 
autonomy and the juche creed." 4 Moreover, North Korea was surrounded 
by other impoverished countries under autocracy. Unlike Eastern European 
countries located a short distance from Western Europe, DPRK is stuck in a 
corner of East Asia. The border between South and North is one of the most 
fortified in the world, and the border with the People's Republic of China, 
another socialist country, could be controlled. Moreover, it was easier to 
brainwash citizens when the internet and other modern technology were not 
available.' '5 
Communism has since faded as viable ideology. To Pyongyang's det-
riment, South Korea, which was supposedly worse off than North in the 
1960s, has since managed phenomenal economic growth. The state moni-
toring system, which forcefully watched over whether anyone makes any 
blasphemous remarks on Kim Il-sung, weakened through the famine. 
Kim Jong-un is not as compelling a leader as his predecessors. Kim Il-
sung built his power base touting his struggle for Korean independence 
against Japanese colonists. Kim Jong-il had been a de facto leader, and had 
been in the public eye at least since the 1970s, before he officially assumed 
power in 1994. Kim Jong-un, on the other hand, is a young leader and a 
relatively new face, with few achievements to show for it. There was an 
expectation for change when Kim Jong-un, who allegedly received his edu-
cation in Switzerland, first came to power in December 2011. It subsided, 
114. See JOHN EVERARD, YEONGKUK OEGYOGWAN PYONGYANG-ESEO BONAEN 
900-IL, (A U.K. diplomat spending 900 days in Pyongyang); SEONG-HA Ju, BUKHAN 
BARO BOKI (Taking a Right Look at North Korea); SEOUL-ESEO SSEU'NEUN PYONGYANG 
IYAKI (Tale of Pyongyang Written in Seoul). 
115. See also ANDREI LANKOv, THE REAL NORTH KOREA: LIFE AND POLITICS IN 
THE FAILED STALINIST UTOPIA (2014). 
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22 
however, when he proved to be the same type of a closed, repressive ruler 
as his father and grandfather. 
The execution of Jang Seong-taek, Kim Jong-un's uncle, 1 6 hit the 
headlines in December 2013. To solidify his power in the chaotic days of 
the 1940s and 1950s, Kim Il-sung purged some of his socialist comrades 
and rivals such as Pak Heon-yeong. The method served Kim well, as it 
cleared the way for him to evolve as a glorified character under the juche 
philosophy. His grandson, Kim Jong-un, draws from the same approach, as 
he gets rid of his much older competitors by the dozen."17 Whether such a 
Machiavellian style of governance will continue to work in the twenty-first 
century remains to be seen. 
2. Economic Changes 
Donju, a class of nouveau riche who acquired wealth from commercial 
activities, is springing up not just in the capital, but in almost all major 
cities in DPRK. Traditionally, the richest people in North Korea were those 
at the top of WPK and the military, who enjoyed spoils from state busi-
nesses. Recently, however, the new capitalist class is emerging as a new 
force. Donju act as corporate executives in transportation, real estate, trad-
ing and other sectors, and manage investment, business development, and 
human resources. In a country with crumbled financial institutions, donju 
feed much needed capital, and local economies would freeze without their 
economic resources. To protect their status, donju give bribes and lend 
money to financially strapped government enterprises. Stable collusion be-
tween the government and the new bourgeois can add to Kim's power. Al-
ternatively, any discontent seething from those who tasted the fruit of 
capitalism can have a destructive result." 18 
116. Jang was one of the protectors who guided Kim Jong-un to power, after Kim 
Jong-il fell ill in the 2000s and became virtually unable to attend to national 
administration. 
117. According to Gukga-jeongbo-won (National Intelligence Service), the num-
ber of high officials who were executed was 3 in 2012, more than 30 in 2013, and 31 in 
2014. See Hankook Ilbo, Kim Jong-un-ui gongpo-tongchi-neun leadership bulan 
bangleung, buk ganbu 70-yeomyeong sukcheong (Kim Jong-un's Rule of Terror Gives 
Circumstantial Evidence of His Uncertain Leadership, more than 70 high officials were 
purged), HANKOOKI.COM, http://daily.hankooki.com11page/politics/201505fdh2015051 
3121805137590.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
118. See generally Kim Hwan Yong, Private Lenders Emerge as North Korea's 
New Middle Class, VOICE OF AM. (June 10, 2015), http://www.voanews.com/content/ 
private-lenders-emerge-as-north-korea-new-middle-class/2816737.html; Ju-Min Pak 
and James Pearson, Pyongyang Bling - The Rise of North Korea's Consumer Com-
rades, REUTERS (June 4, 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/04/uk-northkorea-
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ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE (Unit: %) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
CROP PRODUCTION (Unit: 1,000 metric tons) 
a ,, 4,806 4,802 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
North Koreans no longer starve to death by the hundreds of thousands 
as they did in the 1990s. The North Korean economy contracted from 1990 
to 1998, but modestly expanded from 1999 to 2005. Food production also 
rose from 3.5 million tons in 1998 to 4.8 million tons in 2014, and is now at 
a level where the country can sustain itself with foreign food aid. 19 How-
ever, DPRK by no means is an affluent country. Everything from petroleum 
change-consumption-idUKKBNOOJ2UY20150604; Bukhan-eun jikeum donjudeul-ui 
jeonseong-sidae (Donju are having a prime time in North Korea), RADIO FREE ASIA, 
http://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly-program/bd8 Id55c-c774ac8c-bb38c8 Icc9cOc694/fe-
cp-062320151051 10.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
119. Bukhan tong'gye (North Korean Statistics), STATISTIC KOREA, http://kosis.kr/ 
bukhan/statisticsList/statisticsListO1List.jsp#SubCont (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
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to drinking water to automobiles is in short supply, and a large number of 
residents are still undernourished.' 
20 
As North Koreans suffered through starvation in the 1990s, corruption 
became rampant as a survival mechanism. Now giving and receiving bribes 
are a routine method of operation. Money can open doors to such "reaction-
ary" activities as watching South Korean TV or travelling inside the country 
without state authorization. The central government would not risk breaking 
the entrenched link of illegality, particularly since it does not have enough 
money to pay state employees.12 ' 
Unlike Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un himself exper-
ienced capitalism when he attended school in Europe, and may not be 
against it as much. Furthermore, in the absence of much government sup-
port, closing markets down and depriving residents of the last means of 
livelihood would trigger nationwide rebellion. People have little time to 
mull over the meaning of democracy when they struggle for daily existence. 
When their life gets a bit better, however, they can look around themselves, 
and that's when autocracy should be most worried. 
3. Hallyu 
What would be most destabilizing to the regime is the "Korean wave" 
of entertainment sweeping through North Korea. South Korean TV shows, 
which gained popularity in Asia and other parts of the world beginning in 
1990s, finally landed in DPRK. North Koreans most commonly sample 
South Korean media through compact discs and USB drives smuggled from 
China. To earn foreign exchange, Pyongyang is sending tens of thousands 
of workers to China and the Middle East, who may get further exposure to 
South Korean culture. Seoul accent and style appear to be trendy among 
some young people. 
Perhaps the phenomenon of K-pop may have been exaggerated. It is 
hard to accurately gauge the extent and effect of K-pop on North Korean 
residents. Even if they have unprecedented access, they may only get a 
distorted or inaccurate image of the outside world therefrom. 122 The fact 
nonetheless is that Pyongyang is no longer retaining absolute control over 
what the population is seeing and hearing. 
120. See generally Rep. of the comm'n of inquiry, supra note 9. 
121. EVERARD, supra note 144. 
122. Hankook Ilbo, Bukhan-e buneun "Hallyu yeolpung," cheje jeohang bureuji 
aneuldeut (The hot wind of hallyu blowing in North Korea won't induce anti-regime 
resistance), HANKOOKI.COM, http://economy.hankooki.com/lpage/politics/201502/ 
e2015021316012193140.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2016). 
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4. Ground Shift 
It was easy to stay loyal to the government and its dogma when the 
state provided a social safety net for everyone. Those comfortable days are 
a distant memory now, however. Those who grew up in the 1990s and 
2000s were basically left on their own without generous state subsidies, and 
are not very familiar with communism in its raw form. What's more, the 
state continuously solicits money and goods such as a shovel and a pig, 
from residents to replenish its revenue. 23 Communist DPRK is officially a 
country without taxation, 24 but commoners are directed to cough off a large 
portion of their hard-earned money. On the other hand, education, medical 
care, electricity and other basic services, which are to be granted free of 
charge under the constitution, are sorely lacking. 
25 
Faith in the government wore away drastically, and unqualified loyalty 
is hard to find now. Grass-roots swelling is far more formidable than diplo-
matic pressure from other countries. All the rounds of six-party negotiations 
and minute intellectual exercise on the ways to enforce international law 
become ancillary, if North Koreans bring criminals to justice themselves. 
The elite in DPRK are evidently aware of what happened to despots 
like Nicolae Ceausescu and Muammar Gaddafi, and cannot help but dread 
an uprising and revenge by the downtrodden. Domestic rebel forces often 
provide the impetus toppling autocracy. No such groups are tolerated in 
North Korea now, and any defiance against the dictatorship thus far has 
been viciously crushed. Still, no one knows how much longer the populace 
will put up with their non-functioning state. 
C. FundamentalRights 
One of the criticisms against NKHRA is that pressing Pyongyang with 
human rights would unnecessarily antagonize it.126 The argument is that it is 
time to work on mitigating the relationship between the two Koreas, not on 
impairing it. What is clear, however, is that North Korea's hostility toward 
123. The pretext for such extraction varies from building a power plant and hous-
ing, to financing national defense and facilitating recovery efforts of a flooded village. 
124. Pyongyang officially eliminated tax in 1974, and celebrates April I as the 
day of tax abolition. Even thereafter, however, the central bank levied some sort of 
duties on enterprises, imports from China, land use, and so on. 
125. Elevators at high-rise apartments in Pyongyang frequently stop for power 
shortage. Patients pay for treatment at an underequipped clinic, and students need to 
provide money or goods to attend school. 
126. KWANG-DEUK PARK, BUKHAN-IN'GWON-BEOP-UI HYEONSIL-GWA GAESEON-
BANGHYANG (Reality of the North Korean Human Rights Act and Directions for 
Improvement). 
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South persisted regardless of whether Seoul is confrontational, or more ac-
commodating of North. Military provocation continued during the liberal 
Kim Dae-jung administration, such as the North Korean attacks on the 
South Korean navy along the western coast in June 1999 and June 2002. 
Nuclear development proceeded throughout the Roh Moo-hyun govern-
ment. 127 Military attacks such as shelling of Yeonpyeong island in Novem-
ber 2010 erupted after years of North receiving help from South. 
Pyongyang does not have much leverage in its dealings with other 
stakeholders. DPRK's official policy is to soon complete a war unifying the 
Korean peninsula. It fully knows, however, that an all-out war against much 
wealthier adversaries would wipe it out. 128 Moreover, human rights are not 
something that should be hidden and discarded so as not "to irritate a bully 
on the block." Normalization of inter-Korean relationships cannot material-
ize without human rights improvement in DPRK. A state which willingly 
starves its population cannot be expected to have sincere exchanges with 
other countries. Constantly trying to placate the rogue regime to prevent it 
from doing something foolish won't provide a solution. 
127. Pyongyang withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003, and 
held nuclear experiments in October 2006 and May 2009. See Bukhan haek-wiki (North 
Korean Nuclear Crisis), MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION, http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/ 
term/viewKnwldgDicary.do?pagelndex= l 1&dicaryld=91 &searchCnd=0&searchWrd= 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2016). 
128. In quantitative terms, North Korean military is superior to that in South Ko-
rea. The number of soldiers in North is more than 700,000, compared to 495,000 in 
South. See World's Largest Armies, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http:// 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/armies.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). North 
also has more tanks, field guns, warships, and so on. See also North Korea Army Tanks, 
Vehicles and Artillery (Since 1950), MILITARY FACTORY (Dec. 14, 2015), http:// 
www.militaryfactory.com/armor/north-korean-army.asp. Weaponry in North, however, 
is generally antiquated, some dating from the Soviet era, and fuel and supplies to keep 
battles going are in severe shortage. See id. Furthermore, intercession by the U.S. will 
make a war not winnable for Pyongyang. See generally Bukhan byeongryeok, namhan-
ui "2-bae" . . . choecheomdan muki apsewo kong'gyeok haedo [North Korean Fighting 
Force is Twice That of South Korea, Even if South Korea Strikes with State-of-the-Art 
Equipment, It Won't Win], JTBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2013), http://news.jtbc.joins.com/ 
article/article.aspx?newsid=NB10241374. Of course, a suicidal war to destroy South 
Korea as well as itself cannot be ruled out. See also South Korea 2014 Defense White 
PaperHighlights DPRK NuclearThreats, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES (Jan. 
6, 2015), http://csis.org/publication/south-korea-2014-defense-white-paper-highlights-
dprk-nuclear-threats. 
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D. National Assembly 
Below, we will explore the South Korean president's human rights and 
general policy toward DPRK since the 1990s. This paper will subsequently 
delve into the responsibility of NKHRA and the National Assembly in this 
policy arena.' 
29 
Seoul, as Washington's friend in its ideological crusade, was staunchly 
anti-communist during the Cold War. Communist DPRK was a foe to be 
conquered. The South Korean government was not in a position to object to 
a breach of human rights in the north in the 1970s and 1980s, however, 
since South itself was under military rule. Things changed in the 1990s 
when the USSR fell and Seoul began to build diplomatic relations with 
former socialist countries. 
The relationship between South and North Korea since the 1990s had 
ups and downs. President Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyun, who highly 
desired historical summit meetings in Pyongyang with Kim Jong-il in June 
2000 and October 2007 respectively, were relatively lenient toward North. 
Under Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine, or Engagement Policy, South's aid to 
DPRK greatly increased, which should have been of great help during the 
food crisis. South Korean tourist visit to Mount Kumgang commenced in 
November 1998, and a discussion began on creating an industrial region in 
Kaesong.' 30 North Korean human rights, however, was not a favorite topic 
of President Kim, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his humanita-
rian works in South Korea and other countries in East Asia. 
The Roh administration adhered to appeasement oward Pyongyang. 
President Roh, who previously made a name for himself as a human rights 
lawyer, was reluctant to bring up human rights, even as the administration 
communicated with North extensively over a host of other questions. In 
fact, the South Korean government under President Roh did not attend, or 
abstained from voting on North Korean human rights resolution at the UN 
General Assembly, Commission on Human Rights, and Human Rights 
Council. The administration voted in favor only in 2006 at the General As-
sembly after international outrage over DPRK's nuclear testing. 
129. EUNG-JIN YEON, HANKOOK-UI DAEBUK-JEONRYAK-E DAEHAN YEONKU [Study 
on South Korea's North Korean Strategy]. 
130. HYUN Soo JUNG, KIM DAE-JUNG JEONGBU DAEBUK-JEONGCHAEK-ESEOUI 
YADANG-Ul SEONTAEK: HAENGTAE-WA YEOKHAL [Kim Dae-jung Government and the 
Choice of the Grand National Party on North Korean Policy]. 
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TABLE 10. VOTING BY THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT ON THE 
UN RESOLUTIONS FROM 2003 TO 201031 
General Assembly 
2005 (60th) 2006 (61st) 2007 (62nd) 2008 (63rd) 
abstained in favor abstained in favor 
2009 (64th) 2010 (65th) 
in favor in favor
3 1See Voting by the South Korean Government, MINIs'rRY o1 UNIFICATION, http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/ 
nkp/term/viewKnwldgDicary.do?pagelndex=1O&dicaryld=93&searchCnd=O&searchWrd= (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2016). 
Pyongyang wishes to procure as much aid as possible from its neigh-
bors, without having to listen to their incessant rebuke. Lee Myung-bak's 
election to presidency in December 2007 therefore was most unwelcome 
news. The Lee administration audaciously announced the "denuclearization, 
reform and 3,000 plan," whereby Seoul would help North Koreans attain a 
per capita GDP of $3,000 if Pyongyang would give up its nuclear program 
and open up the country. As for human rights, President Lee reiterated on 
various occasions a need to bring about progress in North Korean human 
rights, including when he met President Bush in Seoul in August 2008. 
South Korea now began to vote in favor of resolutions at the General As-
sembly and the Human Rights Council. 
Strict policies against North continued in the Park Geun-hye adminis-
tration. At the keynote address at the 69th General Assembly in September 
2014, President Park urged Pyongyang to take necessary measures to imple-
ment recommendations by CO1.131 Upon opening of the UN Higher Com-
mission field office in Seoul in June 2015, Park pointed to the important 
role the office would play. Park also underscored the importance of NK-
HRA, both as president and when she was running for president. 
In the political system in South Korea, presidency has been the branch 
of the government primarily driving inter-Korean policy. The policy closely 
followed the ideological inclination of the chief executive, and a new presi-
dent meant a new rule. The role of the National Assembly, on the other 
hand, has been narrower. 132 The Assembly ratifies legislations on inter-Ko-
131. During the speech, DPRK delegates sat in front seats facing President Park. 
132. JONG-SU KIM, DAEBUK-JEONGCHAEK-SUHAENG-E ISS'EO KUKHEO-YEOKHAL 
JEGO-BANG'AN YEONKU [Reconsideration of the Role of the National Assembly Regard-
ing Administration of North Korean Policy]. 
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rean matters to be enforced by the administrative branch. Non-legislative 
acts include resolutions requiring dialogues between the two countries, or 
denouncing military assault and missile launch. 133 Lawmakers also have the 
power to hold hearings and review foreign policy of the administration, and 
approve an agreement 34 with the North Korean government on such mat-
ters as investment, 135 avoidance of double taxation, 136 and railways 
operation. 1
37 
Beyond such measures, there is not much policy making by the Na-
tional Assembly toward North Korea. Once the Assembly adopts law on 
unification education, 38 support of defectors settling in South Korea, 39 op-
eration of Kaesong complex,'140 and so on, responsibility of daily manage-
ment falls on the Unification Ministry and other administrative agencies, 
non-profit organizations such as Red Cross, even private corporations in 
Kaesong, which employed North Korean workers. Major accords such as 
the joint declaration by South and North on July 4, 1972, and the agreement 
on December 13, 1991, after the two Koreas simultaneously became mem-
133. The Assembly, for instance, released a resolution in June 2010 condemning 
the attack on Cheonan warship. 
134. These agreements are initially signed by administrative officials, but need 
authorization by the Assembly to take effect. BO-HYUK SUH, NAMBUK-GWANGYE-ESEO 
GUKHOE-UI YEOKHAL [The Role of the National Assembly in Inter-Korean 
Relationship]. 
135. NAMBUK-SAI-Ul TUJA-BOJANG-E GWANHAN HAPUISEO [Inter-Korean Agree-
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bers of the UN were issued unilaterally without consent from the National 
Assembly. Unlike in the administrative branch, which revolves around the 
President, power is more dispersed in the legislative chamber. There is no 
one towering leader who can assert its overarching policy on North Korea. 
In that regard, NKHRA provides a forum for the Assembly to unite its 
commitment to human rights protection. Under Article 15, the Unification 
Minister is required to report to the National Assembly the human rights 
situation, the outcome of efforts to promote human rights, and other rele-
vant information. Under such a framework, the law would enable the law-
making body to check and monitor the executive branch, and carve out a 
proper place in this important national question. 
CONCLUSION 
The objectives of NKHRA are threefold: (1) to affirm South Korea 
would not tolerate human rights violations in North Korea, (2) to warn 
wrongdoers of consequences of their violence, and (3) to prepare for transi-
tional justice after the totalitarian rule disintegrates. In ancient times before 
the notion of human equality was fully manifested, a king could do as he 
pleased. Human rights are a topic of urgent priority in the twenty-first cen-
tury, however, and the global media is on alert to detect incidents of human 
rights violations around the world. 
International human rights stand at a cross-section between moral in-
tervention and national autonomy. A self-governing nation should be free 
from meddling by foreign states and international organizations. Human 
rights are a shared value, however, and there are transnational norms to 
conform to. If domestic institutions do not have a means of penalizing 
crimes against humanity, the global community does. Under the theory of 
universal jurisdiction, there is no haven for those committing atrocities. 14 1 
Whether a government has a right to intrude into internal affairs of 
another country is always a thorny question. Seoul is not entitled to inter-
vene on how Pyongyang should behave. It should, however, be noted that 
South Korean aid to North did not halt even during the latter's military 
assaults and nuclear experiment. Pyongyang has not expressed gratefulness 
141. The best-known application of the universal jurisdiction theory was for the 
trial of Augusto Pinochet, who was a dictator of Chile in the 1970s and 1980s. In 
October 1998, Magistrate Baltasar Garzon issued an arrest warrant for Pinochet, who 
was staying in the United Kingdom. Magistrate Garzon relied on the Spanish law, 
which extends criminal prosecution to acts by a non-Spanish citizen outside of Spain. 
See generallyNaomi Roht-Arriaza, The PinochetPrecedentand UniversalJurisdiction, 
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2015-2016] North Korea Human Rights Act 
for the economic support it received, and never promised to eschew future 
aggression. 
The South Korean government does not generally ponder on how to 
protect human rights in other countries, and the National Assembly had 
never legislated law to that effect. North Korea is different, however. The 
two Koreas share language, history, and civilization. Seoul is the very party 
which should start the human rights exchange, and human rights should be 
one of the first issues to be resolved before and after national unification. 
NKHRA is not aimed at invading North Korea or ousting the Kim 
Jong-un regime. Nor should it be deployed as a tool of partisan politics. The 
ultimate goal should be to help deter further cruelty in the north. It should 
be endorsed with broad consent from all sides, procedurally and substan-
tively, and should not be steamrollered through the Assembly by the major-
ity party. 
Human rights are breached in South Korea, too, but in South, means 
are available for citizens to file their claim against the government. Public 
protest is impossible, north of the Demarcation Line. Even if NKHRA does 
not have much physical impact and human rights are a politically charged 
matter, even if the Kim Jong-un dictatorship will not dissolve anytime soon, 
South Koreans should not just keep quiet and condone acts of violence. 
Insanity has been tolerated too long, and speaking out against it is the least 
that could be done. 
